

Power Sharing for Racial Harmony

by

Clarence Ellis and Eric Phillips

Power sharing in Guyana is the best mechanism for achieving inclusiveness in our racially divided and increasingly unstable society. Brother Eusi Kwayana in Stabroek News of April 1st, indicated that it was evident in 1961 that "Indians will not accept an African ruler and Africans will not accept an Indian ruler. At that time, the partition of India had already taken place and Cyprus was in agony." The people in Guyana voted in 1961, Kwayana said, for some kind of joint development of the country. The people's voices were not heard. "The sixties need not have happened," Kwayana said. "When leaders throw aside reason, it seems that non-reason takes over" In The Washington Post of April 4th, 2001, the report of the unrest in Macedonia illustrates the gap in perception that can arise between a majority and a minority. The Slavic majority has striven to make one nation of Slavs and Albanians from a Slav perspective and is surprised at the sense of resentment that Albanians feel and that is fuelling their insurrection.

The task is more than one of re-combining two separate pre-nations back into one stream, with the just aspirations of each satisfied, to use Kwayana's frame of reference. Just aspirations now include other dreams, the dreams of domination and its spoils.

The incentives for non-accountable rule are overpowering. They make it difficult to get rid of the disease of electoral malpractices. After 1992, such malpractices continued in 1997 as the findings of Judge Claudette Singh indicated. The disenfranchisement of the electorate, its unexplainable size, the inaccuracies and irregularities of the voters' list, the undeniable proof of deliberate manipulation-notwithstanding the pronouncements on the integrity of the electoral process by Major Joe Singh and the observer groups-all these malpractices stem from ethnic insecurity and the perceived advantages of exceeding "just aspirations."

As Dr. Laurence Clarke reminds us, these factors constitute the single most factor asphyxiating national life and prosperity in Guyana. Dr. Clarke points out that a recent World Bank study indicates that "social cohesion leads to better institutions and that better institutions lead to higher growth."

Both major parties, all well meaning Guyanese and the international community need to realise that the only way forward is through power sharing. Guyana has an opportunity to move away from the last 40 years of its terrible history. New leadership with new ideas can make the quantum leap of Putting Guyana First and of creating a fully democratic, multi-racial and multi-ethnic society.

The status quo cannot solve Guyana's problem. Courage will. Bold leadership can make the difference.

II. Power Sharing Defined

It was Mr. Haslyn Parris who articulated in Submission No. 11 to the Constitution Reform Commission the preliminary steps for operationalising power sharing. Parris defined power sharing as the proportionate sharing of the decision making personnel of the organs of state among the Parliamentary partners.

But as Kwayana observes, "power sharing requires first a revolution in the view of power in a multi-ethnic society. It should be seen as an energy for the use of society and not as an instrument for a single group.

It must not leave anyone out." In support of that position, Mr. Hoyte has warned that a mere sharing of cabinet seats will not prevent the asphyxiation of national life and prosperity.

Following through on Mr. Parris's recommendations, the proportionate distribution should be applied to:

- (a) The Cabinet.
- (b) The Judicial Commission.
- (c) The Civil Service Commission.
- (d) The Police Commission.
- (e) The Teachers' Commission.
- (f) The Lands Commission and the Deeds Registry.
- (g) The Central Tender Board.
- (h) The Board of the University.
- (i) The Boards of the Corporations (including GUYSUCCO).
- (j) All other statutory boards
- (k) The Regional Democratic Councils.
- (l) The Local Government Organs.

These are the areas where State power and control are vested.

The poor people are distrustful of how the power centres work. To overcome their fear of being sold out by their representatives, arrangements should be put in place to facilitate the appointment of representatives that are answerable to their respective political parties. Among the conditions relating to the tenure of the representatives should be the right of the memberships to recall their representatives.

This is the most fundamental change that power sharing can bring to the way we are governed. Representatives sometimes eschew their role as delegates for collusion among fellow delegates. But to the extent that political parties insist on the priority of their function as delegates, the reporting arrangements between representatives and their political parties will bring enlightenment to the society.

The glare of transparency will reduce the scope for corruption and the incentive for seeking office for personal advancement will be lessened.

III The Executive Branch

The sharing of power at the Executive Level is critical to any power sharing arrangements. If the Cabinet is formed without the participation of the parliamentary parties, it is an indication of failure to effect fundamental change.

Two options have been discussed since constitutional reform was given consideration in the 1992 to 1997 Parliament.

Option 1 Separation of Presidential and Prime Ministerial Affiliation

Usually proposals assign the President, who in Guyana is also the Minister of Finance, to the PPP / C and the Prime Minister to the PNC / R. The view is that the Ministry

that is second in importance is the Ministry of Home Affairs and that this should be the portfolio of the Prime Minister.

Winning Party	President
Second Party	Prime Minister

The powers of the Prime Minister as they exist at present need to be increased so that there are adequate checks and balances in the Executive Branch. Specifically, all key decisions and appointments that were made by the President should be agreed and approved by both the President and the Prime Minister. In those instances where no agreement can be reached, the matter should be referred to Parliament and settled by a two-thirds (2 / 3) majority vote. To reduce gridlock it may be possible to approve some matters with a 50% vote and others with a 60% vote.

Option 2 A Non-Executive President

An alternative suggestion is to have a non-executive President which goes to the Second Party while the Winning Party is assigned the position of Prime Minister and Head of Government. This arrangement is similar to that in Trinidad and Tobago with Mr. Panday and Mr. Robinson.

The advantage of the second option is that the Prime Minister and Head of Government becomes directly answerable to Parliament as Dr. David Hinds points out. In Option 1, apart from the checks and balances set out between the President and Parliament, the parliament becomes a tool of the President who presides over the Cabinet and achieves his legislative agenda through the Leader of the House in Parliament. Option 1 is a hybrid between the Executive Presidency of the U.S.A. and the Parliamentary system of the United Kingdom. It can become rather cumbersome in a power sharing arrangement.

Option 2 preserves the Parliamentary system more completely and allows the non-executive President to be more than ceremonial in that (s) he will sign all bills into law and can exercise veto power if 40% of the members vote against a measure. There will be an incentive for the majority party to compromise or to seek the agreement of the small parties to achieve the 60% majority necessary to pass laws into effect. A differentiation between bills can be considered so that some bills may require a 50% majority and others a 60% majority. Although Option 2 is more efficient for legislative and executive functioning, it has to overcome the perception that the Prime Minister, although the Head of Government, is a "deputy President."

IV The Cabinet

The Ministry of Finance and Planning is the most important Ministry and there is general agreement that the PPP / C should be assigned to that Ministry. In general, political parties should select Ministers who show attributes of vision, competence, honesty, managerial ability, humility and accountability. The combination of these attributes is not readily found among the leaderships in Guyana today but mediocrity in Ministers will not fare well in the glare of colleagues from other political parties and in the rigour of reporting to political constituencies.

The Ministries, in a power sharing arrangement should function as a cohesive whole even though the Ministers represent different political parties. To achieve this cohesion, co-ordination and motivation are necessary prerequisites.

The responsibility for achieving coherence in the operations of the Ministries should fall to the Ministry of Finance and Planning , instead of to the Presidential Secretariat. This coherence will be best achieved if there is agreement on the National Development Strategy (NDS) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). The Budget should be framed in the context of the NDS and the PRS.

The long road to becoming a nation will be traveled if it is agreed that these 3 documents will not be finalised without the full participation of the Opposition parties and should require a 60% majority vote in the Cabinet before approval.

It is this process of approval of these 3 key development approaches by the Cabinet that will constitute the managerial counterpart to the democratisation of the representational functions. The process provides the opportunity for Eusi Kwayana's "re-combination of two separate pre nations back into one stream with just aspirations satisfied but only just aspirations." Single party approval of these just aspirations tend to get out of hand. If managed well , a Guyanese nation can emerge.

The second prerequisite for achieving cohesion is motivation. This should be the purpose of the Commissions-Judicial , Civil Service, Police and Teachers'-- which would be concerned with the personnel functions of wages and salaries, promotion and benefits. Effecting motivation would be best achieved if the personnel functions are transferred to the Commissions. All personnel files should be transferred to the respective commissions and managed by the staffs of the Commissions. If this approach is pursued the Public Service Ministry should be closed. The Commissions themselves should be full time representatives of their respective Commission Boards. Their selection , as already indicated, should be based on the proportionate basis and the chairpersons of the Commissions should rotate every two years. This allows the function of chairing the Commission to fall to one of the smaller parties in the fifth year and spreads participation in the highest managerial positions to all races in the society.

The precise relationships between Ministers and the employees will vary from Commission to Commission but dismissal at the President's pleasure must be brought to an end. In the Civil Service Commission , the wages and salaries will be made equivalent across Ministries so as to make for transferability among Ministries and among Regions and Ministries. Similarly, promotion will be conceived in terms of the whole Service.

There are 16 Ministries, including the Public Service Ministry, but 18 Cabinet Positions when the Head of the Presidential Secretariat and the Prime Minister are added. On the 5: 4: 1 ratio, the PPP/C should be assigned 8 Ministries, the PNC/R 6 Ministries, GAP/WPA with ROAR and TUF 2 Ministries.

The smaller parties, GAP/WPA, ROAR and TUF will need to decide on a rotation arrangement for one of the two Ministries which they will be assigned.

Formation of an 8: 6: 2 team will present a true National Front. It will be a cause for celebration. The equity in this arrangement will have a favourable impact on the entire community.

The list of Ministries is as follows:

1. Ministry of Agriculture.
2. Ministry of Amerindian Affairs.
3. Ministry of Fisheries, Other Crops and Livestock.
4. Ministry of Culture, Youth & Sports.
5. Ministry of Education.
6. Ministry of Finance.
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
8. Ministry of Health & Labour.
9. Ministry of Home Affairs.
10. Ministry of Housing & Water.
11. Ministry of Human Services and Social Security.
12. Ministry of Information.
13. Ministry of Legal Affairs (Office of the Attorney General).
14. Ministry of Local Government & Regional Development.
15. [Ministry of] Public Service Management.
16. Ministry of Public Works & Communications.

V. Additional Programmatic Issues

In the Budget formulation, a major approach to development of the fiscal system would require the withdrawal of Ministers from day-to-day decisions on exemptions from indirect taxation, the improvement of the data base to make coherent planning possible, the attraction into the tax net of the thousands of businesses who pay no taxes at present and the upgrading of managerial functions of the lead bureaucrats to increase productivity and to achieve the targets of the NDS and the PRS. In the PRS, more participatory arrangements are necessary. These will be considered more fully under Local Government Autonomy.

The political parties will bring to the Cabinet such additional issues as their constituencies consider important. To the extent that immediate attention is necessary and that they are not considered under the NDS and the PRS, priorities will be determined on a rough cost-benefit analysis by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.

Some of the areas listed by President Hoyte in his recent address to the nation include:

Rehabilitation of the bauxite industry; Land Reform; Management of SIMAP; Education Reform; Revival of economically depressed areas; Financial and business facilitation; and Population statistics by region, city, towns, villages, sugar estates, districts and hinterland settlements.

The present ignorance of the population in the various districts is a national disgrace. The data weaknesses provided the basis for the pervasive inflation of electoral lists in 1997 and 2001.

These are concrete steps and the operational bases to be established if power sharing is to be successful. With the Commissions structured as suggested, the Civil Service will have greater independence from the Ministers and continue to manage the society if Ministers are temporarily withdrawn. Greater continuity will result.

VI The Parliament

The Constitutional Reform Commission has addressed many issues relating to Parliamentary Democracy in Guyana. The proposals agreed upon should be passed into legislation within three months. Critical institutional arrangements such as the Ethnic Relations Commission are essential to assist with fairness and racial healing though the programmes related to the NDS, the PRS, the Budget, and the issues such as Land Reform and the revival of economically depressed areas and regions will constitute the substantial elements of a racial equality social objective.

VII Constitutional Reform

The Report of the Constitutional Reform Commission to the National Assembly, dated July 17th, 1999, contains a number of recommendations that, to date, have either not been acted upon or not been adequately addressed. These recommendations should be enacted and given due force within the next three months:

VIII Management of Infrastructure Modernisation

The lack of transparency and the obvious preferential treatment of contractors who have been supporters of the Government have led to inequities, to inefficiencies and to massive corruption. The Multi-lateral Financial Institutions (MFIs) have often contributed to the inequity bias by exercising weak oversight in areas where conflicts of interest have predominated but have been rigid in their preference for large contractors. The IDB has even reversed the Government's belated recognition of inequity in respect of the big criterion efficiency.

Procurement rules in MFIs are not easily changed. But the big contractor phenomenon should not be tolerated. It is not contributory to equity which is the basis for the power sharing innovation.

Affirmative Action

A mechanism must be implemented that ensures that contracts are awarded to contractors of all racial groups in proportion to their ethnic percentage of the population. This must apply both to the volume of work and the financial value of the contract budget.

Transparency

All contracts must be awarded under a system of total freedom of information. Data on the status of tenders must be available for public scrutiny at every stage of bid evaluation. Provisions must be made for public objections to be heard regarding the intention of the government to award major contracts to companies before the award is made.

Prioritisation

The priorities of projects have often been determined by political factors more so than by economic benefits. Ratios of benefits to costs should be applied to the determination of the major infrastructure projects such as those proposed by Guyana 21 and by proponents of the Berbice river bridge.

IX Financing Democracy

We cannot continue to ignore the mandate given to opposition parties. If a portion of the tax-paying population of the country believes that their best interests are served

by a particular party and have given it their votes, then the administration has a duty to ensure that the party is kept alive and is enabled to contest future elections.

Maintaining Democracy

An allocation for the maintenance of the democracy must be made in the annual budget and apportioned to the parties that received votes in an election, in proportion to the votes they received. This holds true, whether the party received adequate votes to gain a seat in parliament or not.

Campaign Financing

All parties that received votes in an election must receive financial assistance to contest the next election, should they opt to participate.

X Local Government Autonomy

The Constitutional Reform Process must be made to include a new and more meaningful local government structure. This will address the following key issues: Ancestral Rights and Lands; Spreading Governance; and Ancestral Rights and Lands

Whereas ancestral rights and lands are already recognised, albeit inadequately, in the Laws of Guyana as they relate to Amerindian peoples, other ethnic groups are not considered.

Africans are the only racial group in the country, which was brought to Guyana by force, and was forced to labour in the early days of the country's history. Indeed the foundation for the country's overall development was laid by means of the uncompensated exploitation of Africans. After emancipation, African Guyanese occupied and settled lands that still have not been transported to them. Their entitlement to these lands must be legally recognised just as readily as the entitlement of Amerindian peoples to their ancestral lands is recognised.

Spreading Governance

The power exercised by Central Government must devolve to a level that is closer to the people, for democracy to be accepted as functioning in Guyana. The Constitutional Reform Process must address the creation of a mechanism for granting to local government structures an adequate share of the legislative, fiscal, planning and administrative power over their geographic constituencies to react speedily and meaningfully to local needs.

Mechanisms must be created to allow individuals to run for elected office within their geographic constituency without affiliation to any political party.

Reform of the constitutional arrangements for the City Council, the village councils, the district councils and the Regional Development Councils are exceedingly important in spreading governance. Properly executed, these changes will provide the opportunities for the growth of communities as desired in the Federalist proposals.

IX The Opposition

Mr. Hoyte is always concerned correctly with the effective removal of the Leader of the Opposition from the constitutional arrangement. It is indeed a big issue.

However, the Leader of the Opposition of a racial party in a situation where the minority party will be in opposition perpetually will most likely entrench the segmentation of Eusi Kwayana's separate pre-nations.

Guyanese have a tendency to avoid making the hard decisions and undertaking unpleasant analyses that are necessary to achieve fundamental changes. Mr. Hoyte's Leader-of-the-Opposition functions must be transferred successfully to the representational arrangements. The scrutiny that will normally result from an effective Opposition should emerge from a thorough scrutiny by the Political Parties as they review the decisions made by their representatives on their behalf. This arrangement should be considered as temporary until the Political Parties can be reformed.

The hard political fact to be accepted is that the Political Parties are racist to the extent that an Afro Guyanese cannot lead the PPP and an Indo Guyanese cannot lead the PNC. These Political Parties have to be reformed so that their racial orientation is changed to an ideological one. This reform concept is not entertained. Party members have come to accept the implicit racism of their operations.

Another dimension of their operations makes reform difficult and that relates to their respective cultural heritages. There are authoritarian biases in the PNC perhaps reminiscent of the house slave/field slave dichotomy of post slavery society. In the PPP, the exclusivist tendencies inherent in Hinduism that will make reform very difficult are of much more ancient antiquity. The Hindu religion justifies inequality. That makes equality of opportunity as an ideal between Hindus and non Hindus almost impossible. Some acculturation of the Hindu inequality / exclusivity thinking has taken place but it surfaces all the time in everyday activities and is partly responsible for the visceral reaction of African Guyanese to the prospect of a never ending perpetuation of PPP rule. Afro Guyanese know instinctively that such rule means dominance, and that for many Hindus, dominance of those perceived as subordinates is not unjust.

The power sharing arrangement allows for some opportunity to change the nature of the Political Parties. The analyses have to be robust and applicable to these cultural phenomena. They should be as critical of the house slave / field slave dichotomies as they are of inequality / exclusivist thinking. It is this frankness in analytical approaches that will restore the disastrous tendencies to underachievement that has afflicted Guyanese in their societal arrangements.

XII Ensuring Public Confidence : The State-Owned Media

The media influences views, perceptions and reality. The two main parties both agreed in their manifestos to the divestment of the State media. We believe that in the period prior to this divestment, the State media should be managed by a committee or commission comprised of representatives of the parties in Parliament in proportion, as far as reasonably possible, to their seats in Parliament, whereby the Chairman of the committee or the commission would be selected by the President from a list of four persons nominated jointly by the Parliamentary opposition parties. Such a mechanism would ensure fairness and equity.

The Disciplined Forces, the Civil Service and the Bigger Private Sector Firms

The Constitutionally enshrined Ethnic Relations Commission should be specifically charged with addressing problems associated with the ethnic imbalances in the

disciplined forces, in the Civil Service and in the bigger Private Sector firms. Data on employment by racial groups should be collected before imbalances are addressed.

Further, with regard to the Police Force, a special Oversight Committee should be created that would be comprised of representatives of the parties in Parliament in proportion, as far as reasonably possible, to their seats in Parliament, whereby the Chairman of the Committee will be selected by the President from a list of four persons nominated jointly by the Parliamentary opposition parties.

The Parliamentary Sub-Committees and the Boards of State Entities

The Parliamentary sub-committees and the Boards of all State entities would be comprised of representatives of the parties in Parliament in proportion, as far as reasonably possible, to their seats in Parliament, whereby the Chairman of each sub-committee or Board will be selected by the President from a list of four persons nominated jointly by the Parliamentary opposition parties.

XIII Conclusion No "Winners," No "Losers"

The people have again voted, as they did in 1961, for a solution to the racial impasse. They know that state power impacts on race relations and are demanding of their political leaders an end to this political disease that has sickened and exhausted the nation for more than 40 years. On this occasion, we must not throw aside reason. We must listen to the heartbeat of the people. We cannot let non-reason take over. The choice is between the steps towards becoming one nation, as Kwayana puts it, or continuing those expensive steps towards becoming several states, the classic example of a "failed" state. Local Government Autonomy efficiently executed will provide the opportunities for the full expression of cultural pursuits that the "Federalists" demand.

For racial diversity to become our greatest asset instead of continuing to be our greatest liability -to borrow from Professor Clive Thomas's analysis of our sad performances, the country needs political stability. Power sharing provides the framework for the achievement of that stability. The fundamental change should begin in the Executive Branch as it is set out in the Options in this document. Half-hearted window dressing steps will fool no one. Once the first genuine step is made, power must be continuously shared with the people through discussions and the sharing of information. This will remove the fear that representatives will forget where they came from. Once that fear is removed, trust between the races will develop. It is on the basis of trust between the races that progress will be made. Trust is the social capital that we have been denied for 4 decades. Trust cannot be imposed but it can grow in the environment that genuine power sharing can provide. As in the example of Macedonia, large and small minorities must participate in making the decisions that affect their lives.

Notes on Marginalization by David Hinds

Some people have challenged the assessment that African Guyanese are discriminated against and marginalized or feel a sense of marginalization, and have called on them to show proof. To begin with, this challenge reeks of arrogance. How does one measure marginalization of a group in a racially segregated society? Is it possible at all to concretely pin down this phenomenon? My sense is that it is difficult to quantify group marginalization in our context, and any attempt to do so would

only expose ones own biases. This is the case with those who point to the fact that since 1992 Africans have gotten house lots and have had paved roads and newly built schools in their communities. Others have alluded to the fact that poverty has been reduced in the African communities and that the PPP government has neglected Indians while bending over backward to accommodate the needs of Africans. There is a clear confusion here between a government's clientelistic behavior, which is geared towards buying votes and securing "negative" peace on the one hand, and a government's actions and programs aimed at correcting the inherent marginalization of the various sections of the population on the other hand. My argument is that marginalization is built into our post-colonial political and economic arrangements.

The lower or working classes have been and are still marginalized in our societies since, as CY Thomas points out, our governance system, despite some modifications, reflects the same authoritarianism and class domination characteristic of colonialism. Marginalization here means alienation arising from exclusion from the decision making process. And this exclusion is not accidental, but institutional and cultural; it is the basis of the prevailing subject political culture, whereby the masses are directed by the elites and their independent actions are either co-opted by the elite culture or suppressed, often by force. It also includes both institutional (de jure) and intentional (de facto) discrimination.

Group marginalization, like racism, is both perception and reality. It is something the group feels without always being able to show it in concrete terms. It is also difficult to show proof that the government sets out to marginalize one group. Marginalization is the aggregate of institutional and non-institutional exclusion. It springs from an observation and interpretation of the verbal and non-verbal language of the group that holds power. It is the feeling that someone of the other race is spying on you at the workplace. It is when the symbols of power in the society don't reflect your group. It is compounded when the basic facilities in your community do not compare favorably with those in the communities of the other group.

This is what the vast majority of Indians felt during PNC rule, even though the Indian commercial class did well and the African masses suffered similar indignities to those suffered by Indians. Marginalization in Guyana is essentially class marginalization, but given the fact that class identity in Guyana is smothered and compromised by racial identity, exclusion and alienation take on a racial twist.

Power is exercised by one section of the elite at a time, which true to its class instincts maintain this exclusionary culture, including the exclusion of the lower classes of its own race from the decision making process. But because of the racial polarization and competition between Africans and Indians, there is a convergence of the attitudes of the elites and the masses on the question of racial dominance. Therefore, despite their exclusion from the political process, the African and Indian masses condone the excesses of their leaders, especially when they are in power.

As a reward for this endorsement or racial legitimization, the government steers a disproportionate portion of the small pie to its constituency mainly in the form of policy decisions. For example, the 1957-64 and 1992-2001 PPP governments have weighted its economic policy mainly in favor of the agricultural sectors -rice and sugar - where Indians predominate, while diminishing the importance of the bauxite sector where Africans predominate. Further, its IMF/World Bank-led economic liberalization program has led to increased opportunities for the commercial sector

where Indians dominate and a simultaneous downsizing and wage contraction in the Public Service where Africans dominate.

One may argue that these choices by the government are motivated by the logic of the IMF/World Bank conditionalities. But the question still remains: what has the government done to correct these deficiencies? Build schools, pave roads, and share out house lots? Well these were done in Indian communities also. Significantly, what the government has not done is tailor the IMF/World Bank conditionalities to cater to the historical racial compartmentalization of the economy, or implement alternative programs aimed at changing the balance of power between the two races in terms of equality of opportunity. It is important to understand here that the argument is not that Indians are economically better off than Africans. Of course not. But given the racial nature of the state, the Indian masses have more potential opportunities for empowerment on account of where they are located in the economy and the fact that they get more government "trickle down," or what the Americans call "pork" because their votes are important to keeping the government in power.

The PPP's marginalization of Africans is inevitable. In placating its supporters, that party invariably marginalizes Africans, since it is impossible in the circumstances for the one-party government to balance the demands of its working class supporters, and those of the opposition supporters, the section of business class that finances the PPP, and the International Agencies. One of those groups has to be sacrificed; because Africans are least useful to the PPP, they are the obvious choice. When one adds to this mix, the element in the PPP that relishes the opportunity to punish PNC supporters and /or fixated on retribution, the end result is marginalization.

It is quite acceptable in most societies for governments to fill key positions of authority in the state with people it trusts or its supporters. But that principle is problematic in multiracial societies like Guyana with two major races of almost equal population size. Since PPP supporters are Indians, they fill most positions of authority and when an African occupies one of these positions, he or she is either a PPP loyalist or a "neutralist." So the question here is not simply the number of Africans and Indians in a given government department, but who makes the decisions. Africans, therefore, are locked out of the decision-making centers ostensibly because of the party they support. But since party and race are synonymous, in the final analysis they are locked out because of their race. That is one of the reasons that I have persistently argued for power-sharing as it puts Africans alongside Indians in the decision making process, thus increasing the potential for decisions that reflect the interest and needs of both races, and minimizing the room for and the feeling of racial marginalization.