Non-intervention and intervention: CARICOM in action - Grenada 1979 and 1983
Posted September 1st. 2002 - by Rashleigh Jackson
Rashleigh Esmond Jackson held the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guyana between 1978 and 1990. Prior to the commencement of his diplomatic career in 1964, Mr Jackson, a mathematician and qualified teacher, taught at his Alma Mater, Queen's College. His appointment to ministerial office in 1978 was preceded by service in various capacities including that of Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1969 to 1973 and as Permanent Representative of Guyana to the United Nations from 1973 to 1978.
Stabroek News asked Mr Rashleigh Jackson to reminisce on some of the events which took place during his tenure as Foreign Minister, and in which he played a role. The following is the first feature in a four-part series which will appear fortnightly.
The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states has been a cornerstone of international law and an important desideratum of state practice. States have traditionally held this principle dearly.
The principle is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2.7 which states inter alia "Nothing contained in the present Charter should authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state..." Further, there are numerous resolutions of the United Nations which reaffirm this principle and call for its observance by states. As well, an initiative was taken by Guyana and other non-aligned countries in 1981 as a result of which the United Nations adopted a Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States.
This
principle was invoked in 1979 in respect of Grenada. On March 13 that year,
Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement staged a coup d'etat in Grenada and overthrew
the government of Eric Gairy. That coup d'etat, which one Prime Minister of
the then Eastern Caribbean Common Market countries described as a "coup de
radio," evoked reactions in the Caribbean of both relief and concern. Relief,
because the actions of Prime Minister Gairy, a self-styled mystic, had caused
uneasiness among many CARICOM countries and peoples, and concern, because
of the precedent which the Bishop coup, the first in a CARICOM country, would
set in the region.
Maurice
Bishop
In the early afternoon of March 13, Maurice Bishop made contact by telephone
with Prime Minister Burnham. Bishop indicated that he had tried to reach Prime
Minister Manley but was unable to do so as Manley was reportedly otherwise
engaged. He, however, spoke with Mrs Manley. The purpose of Bishop's call
was to request support from Guyana and Jamaica. Prime Minister Burnham subsequently
contacted Prime Minister Manley and proposed that there should be a meeting
of CARICOM Foreign Ministers in Barbados.
It was agreed that Guyana would contact St Lucia and Dominica whilst Jamaica would contact Prime Minister Adams who would be requested to make contact with Trinidad and Tobago. Prime Minister Burnham also discussed with Michael Manley his conviction that there should be no outside interference and that CARICOM should define a collective position on Grenada. Burnham indicated to Prime Minister Manley his intention to convey a position along these lines to the representatives of the ABC countries in Guyana - America, Britain and Canada - and suggested that Manley do likewise.
That night, Burnham met separately with the three representatives and conveyed to them the position of the Government of Guyana, that the situation was an internal matter for the people of Grenada to decide, and that there should be no outside intervention. He informed them that CARICOM Foreign Ministers would meet to work a CARICOM response to the Grenada situation and he invited these governments to be guided by the decision of the CARICOM states.
Agreement was reached that a meeting of Foreign Ministers should be held in
Barbados on March 14. I attended that meeting, accompanied by Permanent Secretary,
Harry Dyett. The meeting was chaired by the Prime Minister of St Lucia, John
Compton, as St Lucia was the current Chairman of the CARICOM Standing Committee
of Foreign Ministers. Other Ministers who participated were Henry Forde, Foreign
Minister of Barbados; Carlyle Dunkley, Minister representing Jamaica (PJ Patterson,
the Foreign Minister of Jamaica was in Europe); and the Attorney General of
Dominica, Leo Austin, who was in Barbados en route to London. Trinidad and
Tobago did not attend on the ground that the situation in Grenada was complex
and confusing and sufficient information was not available to it. Nevertheless,
Trinidad requested that any additional information which the meeting may unearth
be passed to it.
In any event, Trinidad and Tobago held the view that recognition is accorded
to states not to governments. The change in government in Grenada did not,
therefore, require a specific act of recognition.
After considerable discussion, the meeting arrived at certain conclusions
on principles and took decision for future action. The Ministers affirmed
that the affairs of Grenada were for the people of that country to decide
and that, as a result, there should be no outside interference.
They recognised that the wider interests of the CARICOM region of which Grenada was an integral part, should also be taken into account.
In
this regard, they were of the view that a return to constitutionality was
required, the continuing functioning of the Governor General being regarded
as an important factor in the circumstances.
It was also observed that the overthrow of a government was contrary to the
traditional methods of changing governments in the region. In this respect,
they took note of the declaration of the leaders of the regime to hold free
and fair elections in due course.
The Ministers felt it was necessary to hold consultations with the regime in Grenada and, therefore, decided to extend the meeting into the following day. At that meeting, a representative of the Bishop regime, George Louison, was present.
In the course of the consultation, Mr Louison was asked by one Head of Delegation when the regime intended to hold elections to validate the revolution. In a pithy response, Mr Louison asserted that elections cannot validate a revolution. He went on to say, however, that the regime was committed to holding free and fair elections, to a return to constitutional normalcy, and to fair play and justice in the society.
A novel idea was put forward by one of the participants for a return to constitutionality.
He said that he put to Maurice Bishop a scenario which could lead to his constitutional
appointment as Prime Minister. The idea was that the acting Prime Minister,
Proudhomme, (Gairy was out of Grenada) would recommend to the Governor General,
the appointment of Maurice Bishop as a Minister without Portfolio.
Once that was done, Proudhomme would resign as a Minister and the Governor
General would then appoint Maurice Bishop as Prime Minister. It was reported
that Bishop was interested in the idea. Some leaders of delegations at the
meeting expressed their support for the idea. Guyana was of the view that
Bishop should confirm his position to the meeting. However, Proudhomme refused
to cooperate. Despite lengthy conversations between the proposer of this idea
and Proudhomme and Minister Hosten, both declined to support the idea. It
was speculated that they were afraid that Gairy would somehow get at them.
US
troops in Grenada, 1983
British
Windward Islands
After discussions with the representative of the regime, Mr George Louison,
the Ministers agreed on a joint statement in which it was reaffirmed that
the affairs of that country were for the people of that country to decide
and, accordingly, there should be no outside interference. Ministers took
note of the stated declaration of the leaders of the regime to hold free and
fair elections as well as the intention to have the closest relations with
CARICOM states. At the end of these deliberations, the Ministers announced
a consensus reflecting the following positions:
a) It was for the people of Grenada and CARICOM to find solutions.
b) Adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs
of states was reaffirmed.
In the result, no country from outside the region intervened directly in Grenada
at that juncture. During the two days I was in constant contact with Prime
Minister Burnham, and Maurice Bishop called me frequently.
Grenada, naturally, remained a matter of continual interest for CARICOM. The
issue of Grenada re-emerged dramatically on the CARICOM agenda in October
1983 when the revolution imploded and Maurice Bishop and some of his comrades
were killed. The then Chairman of CARICOM, Prime Minister George Chambers
of Trinidad and Tobago, responded to the developments by inviting his CARICOM
colleagues to Trinidad and Tobago for consultations. President Burnham, having
considered the invitation with some of his advisors, accepted it. He, however,
proposed that the meeting commence in the evening of the date proposed by
Prime Minister Chambers in order to enable him to fulfil some prior commitments
in Guyana. Burnham decided that I should go to Trinidad ahead of the rest
of the delegation to ascertain the thinking of delegations, to gather information
on the evolution of the situation in Grenada gleaned especially from sources
in Trinidad.
When I arrived at the Hilton Hotel where the delegations were housed and the
meeting held, I met in the courtyard our Ambassador to Venezuela, Mr Rudy
Collins, who was vacationing in Trinidad. I invited him to be a member of
the delegation. After the Ambassador checked into the hotel, we began talking
to delegations which were already there. Later we met others as they arrived.
Among them were one Head of Government and two Foreign Ministers. Discussions
were also held with non-ministerial members of delegations, members of the
media and others in the Trinidad society. As a result of those conversations,
the following information was obtained and assessment made:
a) the OECS countries had held a 45-minute meeting in Barbados with Prime
Ministers Adams and Seaga of Barbados and Jamaica, respectively. At that meeting,
the decision was taken to impose a number of sanctions against the regime
of General Austin.
b) A military intervention was being contemplated and planned.
c) Prime Minister Price was met by Prime Ministers Adams of Barbados and Seaga
of Jamaica at Grantley Adams Airport, Barbados, while en route to Port-of-Spain.
He was appraised of the intervention plans and lobbied to contribute troops.
He declined the invitation.
It appeared that an invitation from the OECS states to the United States of
America to participate in an OECS-sponsored expeditionary force was agreed
as the way forward.
It was also reported that Venezuela was contacted by one Head of Government
to contribute troops. It was understood that Venezuela was, however, reluctant
to do so. It was also learnt that Prime Minister Cato of St Vincent and the
Grenadines was of the view that contact should be established with the Austin
regime, had in fact proposed to do so but was discouraged from pursuing that
course of action. There were also indications that the Bahamas would be against
any military invasion should the issue arise at the CARICOM Summit.
At the meeting, many of the above ideas were raised. As it turned out, Guyana,
the Bahamas, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago were against any military action
whereas Barbados and Jamaica were clearly in favour of the OECS countries
issuing an invitation to the United States of America to join with them in
an invasion of Grenada. Mr Seaga was alleged to have told one Head of Government
that the United States and the United Kingdom were in favour of such an invasion.
Among the OECS countries, the Prime Minister of St Vincent suggested the taking
of preliminary steps such as establishing contact with the regime as well
as prominent citizens in Grenada with a view to getting a better assessment
of the situation. He was also in support of a fact-finding mission. The agreement
of Prime Minister Simmonds of St Kitts to an invasion was conditional upon
certain other steps.
Late that night, the Chairman announced consensus on a number of elements,
including the following general principles:
a) no involvement of any external elements in the resolution of the Grenada
situation;
b) the resolution of the Grenada situation should be wholly regional (CARICOM)
in nature;
c) the regional solution pursued should not violate international law and
the United Nations Charter;
d) any proposed solution should have as its primary focus the restoration
of normalcy in Grenada.
A specific conclusion enumerated a number of measures designed to effect a
restoration of normalcy in Grenada.
Some OECS countries, particularly St Lucia, were clearly unhappy with aspects
of the consensus. The St Lucia position was that sanctions without the use
of force would be ineffective and greater emphasis should be placed on the
wider security implications of the continuation in office of the Austin regime.
The question of Cuban involvement in the affairs of Grenada and the possibilities that existed for training in subversion were also raised. These factors inspired a call for the complete removal of the Austin regime. Despite this impassioned plea, however, the consensus which was announced by the Chairman was allowed to remain and it was agreed that discussion the next day would be centred around the implementation of the measures agreed upon including possible candidates to form a CARICOM Provisional Government.
The resumption of the meeting the following day was delayed at the request
of the OECS states to enable them to have further consultations among themselves,
Barbados and Jamaica. On the resumption, the OECS states, through their spokesman,
the Prime Minister of St Lucia, indicated that they were still unhappy with
what had transpired the night before. Regarding the earlier discussions as
informal, they sought to deflect attention away from the consensus. On his
part, Prime Minister Seaga denied that he had been part of a consensus. It
became clear that the consultations between the OECS states, Barbados and
Jamaica had led to a conclusion that the consensus should not be allowed to
go ahead and that their earlier plans for military invasion with the involvement
of the United States should neither be sidetracked nor impeded. As was subsequently
revealed, the OECS countries allegedly invited the USA, Barbados and Jamaica,
to join them in a military intervention in Grenada.
The shift from adherence to the principle of non-intervention to support for
intervention as well as participation in such an act on the part of some leaders
of CARICOM, is all the more remarkable when it is recalled that a mere eleven
months before the invasion of Grenada, the Heads of Government of CARICOM
at their Summit held in Ocho Rios, Jamaica, had pledged to respect "the principles
of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other
countries."
The USA, of course, has a long history of intervention in the hemisphere.
Does the involvement of some CARICOM states in the US-led military intervention
in Grenada have troubling implications, especially regarding US expectations
of the future behaviour of CARICOM states in similar situations? This question
is today most pertinent in the light of the US-led war against terrorism in
respect of which there are already at least two worrying developments. The
first is the elasticity in interpretation attached to the concept of self-defence
- going beyond the scope of and, indeed, violating Article 51 of the UN Charter
which reads as follows:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore internal peace
and security."
Israeli action in Palestine readily comes to mind. The second is the US contemplation
of a pre-emptive military strike against Iraq. Is the pre-emptive strike to
become a legitimate option in the security strategy of all nations possessing
the capacity to exercise it, and to do so without the authorisation of the
UN?