Posted September 11th. 2008

On Tuesday July 8th Grenada's New National Party (NNP) became the most recent casualty in what many observers have called a wind of change blowing through the Caribbean these last two years. Of the eight elections held since August 2006, six have produced new governments. Only in Guyana and Trinidad have incumbent parties managed to prevail. But in both cases new Third Parties garnered significantly more votes than is normally the case. Is there an impulse for change that has gained ascendancy in the region? One is tempted to answer this question in the affirmative, but a closer look beneath the raw numbers suggests that this may not be an accurate assessment.

This 2008 Grenadian election was the most important since the demise of the historic revolution in 1983. In effect, it was a referendum on highhanded rule born partly of a political system that gives too much unchecked power to the ruling party and a government that was not shy in pushing those powers to their limit. To understand the significance of the election, a brief overview is needed. The NNP was a creation of the Americans in the wake of the October 1983 debacle. It was the nerve of a new political architecture aimed at erasing both the revolutionary New Jewel Movement (NJM) and the pre-revolution Grenada United Labor Party (GULP) of Eric Gairy. The Americans were keen on creating a "third Republic". But the coalition was tenuous-the only thing they had in common was their anti-revolution feelings. By 1990 the original NNP had split into three factions- the National Democratic Congress (NDC) faction led by Francis Alexis, Nicholas Braithwaite and George Brizan; the Herbert Blaize faction and the Keith Mitchell faction.

Dr. Mitchell eventually wrested control of the original NNP after several internal battles. He led the party to victory in 1995 by defeating the Brizan-led NDC that held office from 1990 to 1995. After some defections, the NNP government fell and early elections were called in 1999. Surprisingly, the NNP gained a second term with an unprecedented clean sweep. That proved to be a turning point as the NNP government, with no official opposition, eventually consolidated the "Third Republic" in its own image.

With unlimited power at its disposal, the government behaved like a monarchy. Crucially, it was politicized the state apparatus in the most extreme manner. It snubbed, marginalized and eventually alienated the political opposition and the so-called Civil Society. It succumbed to the pitfall of unlimited unchecked power and became an unaccountable government. But it also developed its own base particularly among the youth, in part by exploiting the fears of "revolution," taking advantage of a weak opposition and most of all by using the government as a medium of clientelism. The NNP also appropriated what was left of the traditional base of the GULP, which had progressively declined since 1983. Suddenly, the Third Republic began to look like the Gairy "First Republic" and the "Second Republic" of the revolutionary period, but with its own personality and with the cover of democracy. Even after winning the 2003 election by the slightest of margins, it could not restrain itself. Some may disagree with this characterization, but it was the perception among many Grenadians, in and out of Grenada.

In 2003 the NNP faced a reorganized NDC that represented a new coalition of the so-called political moderates and some elements from the second level leadership of the NJM. Ironically it was the extremism of the NNP that produced this new NDC; that's how the two-party system works. Because the system only accommodates two dominant parties at a time, the opposition party benefits from the disaffection created by the excesses of the governing party. This in no way diminishes the organizational work done by the NDC, especially the former NJMs. Gairy's excesses had engendered a similar coalition of the NJM and Herbert Blaize's moderate Grenada National Party (GNP) which contested, and from most accounts, won the 1976 election as the National Alliance.

The 2003 election produced a close result with the NNP hanging on to the government with a one-seat advantage. In fact, the deciding seat was won by a mere six votes and the NNP received less popular votes than the combined opposition. Despite its slim majority and bold challenges by the NDC opposition since 2003, the NNP was able to serve the entire term with few alarms. But it is now clear that its fate was sealed in 2003; the writing was on the wall. The fall from a 15-0 advantage to a one seat majority signified something deeper that was lost on the NNP. The NNP's vulnerability was not helped by charges of corruption, including a much publicized allegation that the Prime Minister had received a large sum of money from a political investor. Although an independent commission cleared the PM of any wrongdoing, the perception of the NNP as a corrupt government had taken root among the government's detractors. But it was the perception of Dr. Mitchell as an authoritarian leader in the mould of Eric Gairy and Forbes Burnham that would ultimately sink the NNP.

The Caribbean political system confers tremendous power in the hands of the Prime Minister. The PM is head of an executive branch that is in practice supreme to the other two branches of government. Caribbean leaders, with few exceptions, have resisted the temptation to use the power of the office to marginalize the opposition and to foist the party on top of the government and state. Among recent governments Dr. Mitchell and the NNP were perhaps the most extreme in this regard. The PM, for example, was unapologetic about the appearance of conflict of interest and often reiterated his belief in the politics of opposition exclusion. This kind of authoritarianism was bound to strike a raw nerve in a country that lived through Gairyism and the heavy hand of the high command of the revolution. The NNP's open and enthusiastic embrace of neo-liberalism which has exacerbated the gap between rich and poor and diminished the ability of Grenadians to own and control the national resources further alienated the population.

The 2008 election, therefore, was a referendum on Keith Mitchell and the perception that he was an autocratic ruler. His overt one-manism was out of sync even in a region that has grown accustomed to one-man leaderism. But Mitchell and the NNP apparently did not recognize this. They dismissed the 2003 vote as ungratefulness on the part of Grenadians; the population was not grateful enough for the few crumbs that went their way. The ruling party sarcastically dismissed offers from the opposition for the formation of a government of National Unity in the wake of the island's devastation by Hurricane Ivan.

The NNP's slogan at the 2008 election was "Let Progress Continue." The question was: progress for whom? Poor working class Grenadians, like their Caribbean sisters and brothers, know that fancy stadiums are not progress for them. They know that the low wage jobs created by the government did not amount to progress for them and their families. They know that the inability to buy land and houses in their own country is not progress. This is what prompted half of the electorate to vote against the NNP - a combination of anti-authoritarianism and frustration with their material circumstances. The NDC got the bigger half and that's enough to win elections in the Caribbean. That the NNP managed to hold on to its base is a reflection of political tribalism which has been a tragedy for. Caribbean politics. But it had alienated a slight majority who turned that alienation into electoral rebuke. The rise in voter turnout from 58% in 2003 to more 80% in the recent election suggests the extent to which the NNP rule has galvanized even those who had opted out of the system.

There are a few lessons to be learned from the Grenada case. First, The NDC won not because it made a superior case or because it presented itself as a clear alternative, but because the larger half of the electorate turned on a government that had gotten out of control. Second, Caribbean governments have to be more sensitive to the effects of their policies on the poor and underprivileged. While foreign investments are critical to development, governments have to strive for a balance between the interests of investors and the security of their citizens. Third, one-man rule and paramountcy of the party are inconsistent with democratic governance. Democracy is not just procedural it is also substantive. In other words how a government governs is as important as or more important than how it comes to power. Fourth, government is not the property of the ruling party; the opposition is also part of the government. There is need to rethink the role of the opposition in the governance of the country. Fifth, given the manner in which the NNP was able to politicize the state apparatus, the new government will find the transition very difficult. It will have to do a delicate balancing act.

Finally, despite the above challenges the NDC has to find a way within the limited framework of winner-take-all Westminster to bring about some fundamental change or it is likely that their stint in office will be short-lived. A look across at its neighbors in St Lucia would bring home this point forcefully. It has to make a crucial decision whether it wants to keep the commandist one-party state that developed under the NNP or it wants to transition away from it. In these circumstances, tempting as it may be, it would be disastrous to play tit for tat with the NNP.

David Hinds lectures in Caribbean and African Diaspora Studies at Arizona State University in the USA. His writings on Politics in Guyana and the Caribbean can be found on his GuyanaCaribbeanPolitics.com website.