Posted July 26th. 2002. - Special Feature by David Hinds

Three dimensions of Power Sharing

Amidst all the current political debate in Guyana, one thing is certain-Power Sharing cannot be ignored. Over the years a few models have been proposed. ROAR favors a Federal System whereby power is decentralized or devolved to the regions. WPA favors executive power sharing or the sharing of cabinet decision making. The PPP and PNC seem to favor "Dialogue" or joint committees arising out of meetings between the PNC and PPP leaders-something short of executive power sharing. Others have been talking about the parliament serving as a source of balancing the power. Some of us favor some sort of combination of some of these.

It is now clear that as useful as the dialogue was, the model has serious limitations in Guyana's context. That the PPP and PNC have divergent interpretations of its success is ample evidence of its failure. The dialogue failed simply because it did not have institutional and constitutional cover.

The PPP government was perhaps morally obligated but certainly not constitutionally obligated to implement the decisions taken by the two leaders. And since politics in Guyana is devoid of morals, the PPP used its constitutional prerogative to either not implement the decisions or tailor them to suit its agenda. The PNC's miscalculation is that it thought goodwill would carry the day. But goodwill is merely a start to the process and not a guarantee of implementation; in highly charged situations changes have to be constitutionally guaranteed.

The other problem with the dialogue is the fact that it was confined to the PPP and the PNC. Although these two parties electorally represent the wishes of the Guyanese people, in some regards parties such as ROAR, WPA, GAP AND GFAP and groups such as ACDA, TUC and Guyana Council of Churches more accurately reflect large sections of the Guyanese desire for active racial unity, socio-economic empowerment and a national community. As such any dialogue aimed at arriving at a national consensus should involve representation from these quarters. The other benefit of having these groups is that they could serve as a mediating or at least tempering influence on the two adversaries.

But suffice to say that we know that dialogue as constructed by the PNC and the PPP doesn't work because we worked it and it failed to have any calming or desirable impact on the situation. We now must look at other models.

We have discussed at length the executive power sharing model, whereby parliamentary parties sit together in the cabinet and make and implement decisions. In a sense this is like taking the dialogue between Mr. Hoyte and Mr. Jagdeo into the Cabinet. The difference is that with executive power sharing, they will both be responsible for not just taking decisions but implementing them. The PNC in such a scenario will get a chance to share in deciding things like house lot distribution, awarding contracts, staffing state boards, the future of bauxite, village development, what to do with the Black Clothes, and all the other things it can now only complain about.

Now people especially PNC supporters please tell me what is bad or evil about such a form of Governance?

We stress sharing cabinet power because the cabinet is where all effective governmental powers reside. Parliament's power is theoretical because in reality the party that controls the executive (cabinet) controls the parliament and by extension the judiciary. So if one is talking about sharing decision making power in the current system, then it has to be in the cabinet. Of course the question of operationalizing that system arises. In our context, that is best arrived at through discussion and negotiation by the parties involved. But that "how it will work?" problem is not the purpose of this letter.

Let's look at the other variation of power sharing-- sharing of power between the cabinet and the parliament. For this model to be meaningful, the balance of power between the two branches will have to be fundamentally altered. First, all executive control of parliament will have to be removed.

Second, there must be some degree of separation of powers. Since I don't think strict separation is attainable in the short term I would as much as possible limit the number of cabinet members sitting in parliament. This separation of power will ensure less conflict of interest on the part of parliamentarians and it will also solve the problem of whether ministers should sit in parliamentary committees. Because they would not be parliamentarians the question of them sitting in committees should not arise.

The third reform aimed at empowering parliament should be raising the bar for the majority needed to pass a bill. I would suggest 60% for ordinary bills and 70% for the budget and other money bills. The same rule should apply for the committees and sub- committees. This would ensure that the government does not use its majority to dominate parliamentary decisions.

Fourth parliament should have the power to summon any member of the executive, including the president to answer questions concerning governmental operations and other issues of national concern. Fifth, the chairmanship of parliamentary committees should be proportionately divided among the parties. Sixth, The Speaker and Deputy Speaker should be elected by a 60% majority of the members. Finally provision should be made for 40% of the motions and bills introduced to come from the opposition.

Should these reforms be implemented, parliament will become an equal partner with and counterweight to the executive, thus allowing for meaningful balance of power. With the institution of a super majority rather than a bare majority, legislative decisions would require opposition consent.

This horizontal balance of power should be complimented with a vertical balance of power, whereby power is divided to local governments. I do not favor the federal system, but I think the village system is crucial. Local authorities should share decision making in crucial areas such as infrastructure and perhaps education. But the key is that local governments should be answerable to parliament and not to the minister of local government and should be given some scope to independently woo economic projects subject to parliamentary approval.

How will all this work? Well the legal minds, the political scientists, the political parties and the representatives of the people's organizations will have to sit down and work out the fine points. Contrary to what is banded about, no individual should come up with some abstract scheme on how these things will work. The final structure must take into consideration the peculiarities of Guyana in the areas of race, class, party politics, fairness, political sensitivities, historical juncture, and level of preparedness.

Dr Hinds is a University Lecturer and Political Commentator and Activist. He currently teaches Political Science at Glendale College and Mt San Antonio College in California. Please send your comments on this article to dhinds6106@aol.com. An archive of Dr Hinds' other writings can be found on his website-guyanacaribbeanpolitics.com.