Posted May 18th. 2004 - Special Feature by David Hinds

Power should not be concentrated in the Executive Branch

Freddie Kissoon's article on the role of the opposition (Kaieteur News May 7) is a timely intervention. It comes at a time when the PNC has once again elevated Power Sharing to the top of the national agenda. The concept of the opposition is one that is deeply ingrained in the Caribbean political psyche and should not be taken lightly. But as I have observed in the past, opposition in the Caribbean framework has more often than not meant overt and covert destabilization of the government of the day. This situation is of course both the cause and the consequence of a mode of governance that has more often than not been largely confined to overt and covert marginalization of the opposition.

Sherwood Lowe, one of the shrewdest minds in the debate on governance in Guyana, has adequately responded to Professor Kissoon's concerns. But I want to seize the opportunity to address another of Kissoon's concerns: the possibility that Power Sharing could lead to a dictatorship of the PPP and the PNC. This is a real concern; there is precedence for it in Colombia. In a sense we already have a dictatorship of the PNC and PPP, albeit a split one. It's a dictatorship that arises out of the logic of segmentation. The PPP and the PNC, acting out of similar interests and without formally agreeing to monopolize power, have actually done so on critical issues. The constitution reform process is clear case of this phenomenon where both parties, for similar reasons, refused to go beyond some formal adjustments to the 1980 constitution.

I, therefore, agree with Kissoon that a power sharing government with the PPP and PNC by themselves would not be the best solution. The problem is that the Guyanese electorate has become even more reluctant to vote for other parties. This trend is expected to change when the fear of domination is minimized or removed, but I don't think it will occur in the short term. And since power sharing must not veer away from democratic elections and representation based on the results of those elections, the small parties must earn their way into the executive branch. If they don't win enough votes to sit in the Cabinet then the stay out as parties.

The next best step is to ensure that power is not concentrated in the executive branch. I am arguing that while power sharing in the executive branch is central to the short-term objective of reducing the clear and present danger of racial insecurity and fear, it is not sufficient to induce substantive democratization and maintain long-term stability. Power sharing for me has a dual objective (1) the encouragement of racial peace and harmony as prerequisites for national consensus and nationhood; and (2) the transformation of formal democracy into more substantive democratic outcomes. Whereas sharing power within the executive speaks primarily to the racial question, sharing power among the three branches speaks to the larger issue of democratization. It is with this in mind that I have broadened my previous model into a multi-dimensional one. I maintain the two planks-- horizontal power sharing (sharing of power at the top) and vertical power sharing (sharing of power between the top and the bottom)-- but I have broadened the vertical plank.

Horizontal Power Sharing has two dimensions: the sharing of power within the executive branch based on proportionality and mutual veto and the sharing of power between the executive and other two branches, the legislative and judiciary. The sharing of power between the legislative and the executive branches is especially important. The principle of separation of powers and mutual oversight are important here.

Vertical Power Sharing, the aspect that widens the base of democratization, has four dimensions. First, there is the sharing of power between the Central government and Local government. This will necessitate the restoration of Village Councils and other local bodies and the devolution of power to them to administer some of their affairs. It will also necessitate a reduced role for political parties at the local level. Since the total exclusion of parties from local elections (which I prefer) will not sit well in our party- centered society, I propose that 30-40% of seats be allowed to parties and 60-70% to citizens' groups.

The second dimension is the sharing of power between and Civil Society and the government. This should be actualized through the creation of a second house of parliament-a nominated house- where representation should be shared by the parties and Civil Society organizations. The third dimension is the sharing of power between the political managers and the Civil Service. Since the politicization of the Civil Service, the parties have dominated it. Power Sharing will restore the autonomy of the service and empower it to serve as a check on executive excesses, something that would be most helpful in minimizing corruption.

The final dimension is gender power sharing. This is most important to my power- sharing model. It is well known that men dominate the upper echelons of the power structure. I, therefore, endorse the WPA's proposal of a woman's vice- president and recommend that the 30% rule that governs electoral slates should apply to all councils of governance-cabinet, both house of parliament and local government. Gender power sharing holds the prospect of bringing fresh ideas to the table that could well turn out to be the deviation from the acrimony that now characterizes governance.

David Hinds lectures in Caribbean and Africana Studies at Arizona State University in the USA. He is also a political and social commentator who has written extensively on Guyana and Caribbean politics. More of his writings can be found on his GuyanaCaribbeanPolitics.com website.